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“India’s Rasputin”?: V. K. Krishna Menon
and Anglo–American Misperceptions of Indian
Foreign Policymaking, 1947–1964
PAUL M. MCGARR
From 1947 until his political demise in late 1962, Vengalil
Krishanan Krishna Menon stood at the forefront of India’s inter-
national relations. One of Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru’s
closest political confidantes, Menon served variously as India’s
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, leader of its dele-
gation to the United Nations, self-styled mediator in the Korea,
Indo–China, and Suez crises of the 1950s and, from 1957,
his country’s Defence Minister. Vilified in the West as “India’s
Rasputin,” Menon’s left-wing credentials, anti-colonial rhetoric,
and willingness to engage with the Communist bloc were seen
by Anglo–American diplomats as a threat to Western interests in
South Asia. Drawing upon recently released British and American
archival records, this article argues that Western misperceptions of
Menon, and his role in the Indian foreign policy-making process,
undermined Anglo–American relations with India for much of the
early Cold War.
While it is true that Krishna has helped us on occasion. . . . . I neverthe-
less rate him for my own part as a thoroughly dangerous man, indeed as
Nehru’s evil genius—a born conspirator and intriguer, making mischief
wherever he goes, utterly unscrupulous, determined to mark his mark in
the world, and now gradually undermining, whether deliberately or not
. . . the whole conduct of India’s foreign relations.
Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, October 19541
In November 1959, India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, turned 70.
The first and, at that time, only leader that India had known since the
British departure from South Asia in August 1947, Nehru’s seventieth birth-
day stimulated domestic and international debate on India’s prospects in a
post-Nehruvian world. The question of political succession in India, or “after
239
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Nehru, who?” had occupied New Delhi society and the world press from the
mid-1950s.2 By the turn of the decade, however, as India’s ailing prime
minister tired and Sino–Indian relations soured, international policy-makers
became increasingly concerned with whom, or perhaps more pertinently,
what forces, would shape the future of the world’s largest democracy.3 In
November 1961, following Nehru’s ill-fated visit to the United States, the
American secretary of state, Dean Rusk, observed that the Indian leader
appeared “greatly aged . . . [and was] in effect being run by others.”4 In sub-
sequent off-the-record briefings with American journalists, Rusk reiterated
Washington’s impression that “Nehru is old and ill . . . he is in office but he
doesn’t fill it.”5 The British government felt much the same. Earlier in 1961,
British officials had voiced misgivings that Nehru appeared either unable,
or unwilling, to prevent malevolent forces inside his administration from
exercising an undue influence over government policy. In particular, the
British perceived that Nehru’s hitherto iron grip over Indian diplomacy had
slipped. The foreign policy of India, one senior British official bemoaned in
May 1961, had become, “the foreign policy of Mr. Nehru as modified by the
interventions of Mr. Krishna Menon.”6
During the Nehru era between 1947 and 1964, Vengalil Krishanan
Krishna Menon established a reputation as the most controversial and divi-
sive figure in Indian politics. His political education had begun in the early
1920s as a student at Madras Law College. Then, the British theosophist
and political activist, Annie Besant, had introduced him to the Indian Home
Rule movement. By the end of the decade, with Besant’s financial support,
Menon’s commitment to Indian nationalism had been honed at the London
School of Economics under the tutelage of the political scientist and promi-
nent socialist, Harold Laski. It was in London in the early 1930s that Menon
first met Nehru. Menon went on to form a close personal and political bond
with the future Indian leader, earning plaudits from Nehru for his service as
secretary of the India League, the principal organisation promoting Indian
nationalism in pre-war Britain.7
Once India had gained independence in August 1947, Menon experi-
enced a meteoric rise to political power under Nehru’s patronage. In 1947,
Nehru appointed him to the prestigious post of Indian High Commissioner
to the United Kingdom. After completing his tour in London in 1952,
Menon travelled to New York, where he assumed leadership of India’s
delegation to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Acting as a
self-appointed international mediator during the Korea, Indochina, Suez,
and Taiwan Straits crises, Menon achieved global renown as a diplomatic
trouble-shooter, or as the then British foreign secretary, Harold Macmillan,
put it, “Nehru’s Harry Hopkins.”8 In February 1956, dismissing misgivings
voiced by several of his senior ministers, Nehru rewarded Menon’s efforts
by shoehorning him into the Indian Cabinet as minister without portfo-
lio. Elected to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s parliament, for
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the constituency of North Bombay the following year, Menon was again
promoted in April 1957, leapfrogging more established Cabinet colleagues
to become India’s defence minister. Along the way, Menon’s intellectual
arrogance, duplicity, and cynical abuse of his relationship with Nehru antag-
onised a sizable cross-section of Indian political opinion, both inside and
outside the ruling Congress Party. Moreover, Menon’s militant socialism, fer-
vent anti-colonialism, and willingness to engage with Soviet and Chinese
Communists alienated Anglo–American policy-makers and drew stinging
criticism from the Western press.
With some notable, although now dated exceptions, studies of Menon’s
political career have been dominated by largely hagiographic works from
Indian scholars.9 Equally, broader accounts of India’s relationship with the
West during the two decades after 1947 tend to overlook, or obscure, the sig-
nificance of Menon’s role in shaping Anglo–American perceptions of Indian
diplomacy.10 Recently released British and American archival records have
shed new light on the official Western view of Menon and his impact on
Indian foreign policymaking in the Nehru era. The available documentary
record suggests that Anglo–American officials misinterpreted the nature and
extent of Menon’s influence over Indian foreign policy between 1947 and
1962. Moreover, this miscalculation proved as culpable as Menon’s own bel-
licose rhetoric in undermining British and American relations with India for
much of the early Cold War.
Menon’s abrasive personality and readiness to listen to and on occa-
sions publicly endorse Soviet and Communist Chinese positions on a range
of international questions started to ruffle feathers in Washington in the
early 1950s. To American officials his unwelcome meddling in issues, from
Korean War prisoner repatriation to the Hungarian and Suez incidents of
1956, invariably served to advance communist interests. State Department
officers who dealt with Menon on a regular basis in the 1950s charac-
terised him as “venomous,” “violently anti-American,” and “an unpleasant
mischief-maker,” or as one American diplomat observed, “a tough, poi-
sonous bastard.”11 A study of Indo–American relations undertaken in the
United States in the mid-1950s, underlined Menon’s status as a pariah.
Interviews with prominent American academics, journalists, businessmen,
and government officials revealed the existence of a deep-seated and
almost universal antipathy toward him. Respondents labelled Menon “a devil
incarnate,” “a Machiavelli with a swelled head,” and, “a pro-Communist
anti-American blackmail agent.”12
The American media’s view of Menon was equally disparaging.
Throughput the 1950s, United States newspapers portrayed Menon as
“India’s Rasputin,” “the Hindu Vishinsky,” and “India’s Communist-cuddling
roving ambassador.”13 American citizens were routinely presented with a
picture of Menon as a loathsome character, “sharp-tongued,” “devious,”
“insufferably arrogant,” and, “probably the most widely disliked man in
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India.”14 One strikingly suggestive image appeared on the cover of Time
magazine in February 1962. Looking out imperiously at Time’s readers,
Menon’s face was depicted against backdrop containing a hooded cobra
and a snake charmer’s flute. Such crude cultural stereotyping continued in
an accompanying article, which dismissed Menon as, “a malevolent-looking,
tea-colored bachelor . . . [who] despises the West.”15 To many Americans,
Menon became synonymous with representations of Indian naivety and
Cold War hypocrisy. Nehru’s government loudly extolled the virtues of
non-alignment and morality in the conduct of international affairs, yet inex-
plicably it seemed, simultaneously courted the Soviets and ignored UN calls
to implement Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. In the opinion of
one former American ambassador, with extensive service in South Asia, it
was Krishna Menon, above all others, who “epitomized non-alignment and
anti-Americanism, at least in the eyes of a lot of Western officials and the
American public.”16
British officials shared many of their American colleagues’ reserva-
tions. The British Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) viewed Menon
as a “fierce anti-American,” “unscrupulous, egotistical and unreliable.”17
Following one encounter with the Indian minister in March 1957, the nor-
mally unflappable secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Home, was
incensed by Menon’s “arrogant and threatening and abusive,” behaviour.18
British officials who encountered Menon on a regular basis appeared both
fascinated and repulsed by his “tortuous mind.” Britain’s high commissioner
to India in the early 1950s, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, marvelled at Menon’s
aptitude for “intrigue and manoeuvre; his total incapacity to express himself
in any straightforward way; his light regard for the truth; and his inordinate
ambition and self-conceit.”19 Clutterbuck’s successor in New Delhi, Malcolm
MacDonald, felt similarly. Commenting in late 1957 on Menon’s return to
the United States to lead India’s UN delegation, MacDonald observed acidly,
“Of course he ought to be going to New York to see a psycho-analyst, not
to attend the Assembly of the United Nations.”20
Personality issues aside, Menon’s interaction with British and American
officials was complicated by the commonly held perception that he har-
boured communist sympathies. As secretary of the India League in the 1930s,
Menon had forged an alliance with the Communist Party of Great Britain to
promote the cause of Indian independence. To Britain’s domestic security
service, MI5, this marked Menon out as politically suspect.21 Question marks
over the nature of his links to British communists persisted after Menon
became India’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and led MI5 to
label him a security risk. In response, the British government withheld sensi-
tive information from India on matters such as Imperial defence lest Menon
pass it on to the Soviets.22 At one point in 1951, Clement Attlee’s government
pressed Nehru to recall Menon from London on security grounds.23 By 1954,
however, in the absence of a smoking gun implicating him in espionage
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activities, the CRO and their colleagues at the Foreign Office had largely
discounted the possibility that Menon was a communist agent.24
The same could not be said on the other side of Atlantic. The British
may have dismissed the notion that Menon was a Soviet stooge but, as
they acknowledged, “it was undoubtedly a fact, and a relevant one, that
many high-ranking Americans did hold this view.”25 One in particular was
President Dwight Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. As early
as January 1947, whilst serving as a Republican Party advisor to America’s
UN delegation, Dulles had caused a stir by publicly implying that Nehru’s
interim Indian government was under communist influence. Called to the
State Department to explain his indiscretion, a contrite Dulles insisted that he
had not meant to suggest that India was a Soviet pawn. Rather, his analysis
of Indian politics was based upon observations of India’s UN delegation and,
more especially Krishna Menon, whom Dulles described as a “confirmed
Marxian” and a disciple of Soviet foreign minister, Vyachesalv Molotov.26
Indeed, although the Truman Administration had shown a limited inter-
est in Menon’s activities in the late 1940s,27 it was under the Eisenhower
government in the 1950s that American antipathy toward Menon peaked.
Fed details of his links to British communists by MI5,28 and bitterly crit-
ical of his unsolicited intercessions into East–West disputes, Eisenhower’s
Administration formed a deeply negative impression of Menon. In Dulles’
moralistic vision of a Cold War world, where good battled evil, Menon
was branded “a pretty bad fellow” and a “troublemaker.”29 In turn,
Menon resented Dulles’ criticism of Indian non-alignment, promotion of an
American–Pakistani alliance, and tolerance of Portuguese colonialism.30 With
a “formidable incompatibility of temperament” adding spice to their politi-
cal differences, Dulles and Menon clashed repeatedly in the 1950s.31 In July
1955, in the aftermath of the first Taiwan straits crisis, one typically prickly
exchange saw Dulles excoriate Menon for acting as a Communist Chinese
lackey. In response, Menon made it widely known that he regarded Dulles
as the principal obstacle to peace and stability in Asia. Rather than engage
meaningfully with the substantive international issues of the day, contempo-
rary observes noted that “a great part” of the diplomatic interplay between
Dulles and Menon was invariably “taken up with the process of getting
under each others’ skins.”32
In contrast, Menon’s relations with Eisenhower were, on the surface
at least, more convivial.33 Whilst Eisenhower’s approach to Menon may
have been less confrontational than that of Dulles, his opinion of the Indian
diplomat was much the same. Menon, Eisenhower recorded in his diary on
14 July 1955, “is a boor because he conceives himself as intellectually supe-
rior and rather coyly presents, to cover this, a cloak of excessive humility
and modesty. He is a menace because he is a master at twisting words and
meaning of others and is governed by an ambition to prove himself the
master international manipulator and politician of the age.”34 The American
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president echoed such sentiments in discussions with the British. The British
prime minister, Anthony Eden, informed his Cabinet the same month that
Eisenhower had “made it plain that he had not much use Krishna Menon’s
methods.”35
Whilst senior American officials may have found Menon personally dis-
tasteful, as Eisenhower intimated, they remained wary of his intelligence
and political guile.36 In July 1950, America’s ambassador in New Delhi, Loy
Henderson, had cautioned Washington that Menon represented the “most
effective foe of [the] US amongst Nehru’s trusted inner circle.”37 In turn, the
State Department came to respect Menon’s ability as “a smooth operator,”
conceding that he was “dangerously persuasive” and “a brilliant orator of
the rabble-rousing type.”38 Noting American reservations about challenging
Menon in a UN debate on Korea 1954, the British suspected: “The State
Department . . . are scared of Indian intentions and even more afraid of
Menon.”39
Likewise, American regard for Menon as a political adversary was com-
pounded by the nature of his relationship to Nehru. One of Nehru’s oldest
friends and closest political confidantes, Menon’s socialist credentials, intel-
ligence, and biting wit appealed to the Indian premier.40 In turn, Menon
proved a formidable champion of issues close to Nehru’s heart, from the
merits of non-alignment to the virtue of India’s claim on Kashmir. Whilst
conceding that Nehru did not always accept Menon’s counsel, their rapport,
Anglo–American officials reasoned, left the Indian leader “very apt to be
swayed by him and Krishna’s views have in his eyes a special importance.”41
On a personal level, Menon’s relationship with Nehru was, if anything, even
closer. “Menon,” the British observed in late 1962, “is felt to be one of the
Nehru family (in a way that no other Minister is or has been) . . . indeed
Nehru behaved towards Menon in a manner so paternal as to suggest that
he saw in Menon the son that he had always so much wanted to have.”42
That said, Nehru was conscious of Menon’s considerable faults, not
least his unerring ability to infuriate Western and Indian politicians with his
barbed tongue and congenital mendacity. After receiving one letter of com-
plaint about Menon’s machinations from his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit,
Nehru responded:
I have known Krishna now for a long time and have a fairly good appre-
ciation of his abilities, virtues and failings. All these are considerable. I do
not know if it is possible by straight approach to lessen these failings. I
have tried to do so and shall continue to try. . . . I am not swept away by
Krishna. Krishna has often embarrassed me and put me in considerable
difficulties. . . .43
Whenever Nehru found it expedient to downplay the importance of his
relationship with Menon, notably during periods of acute Indo–American
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tension, he did so. In conversation with Escott Reid, Canada’s high com-
missioner to India, Nehru disparaged the notion, which he conceded was
prevalent in the West, that Menon enjoyed his “special confidence.” “Without
saying anything derogatory about Menon,” Reid reported, “Pandit Nehru
stressed that this impression was quite mistaken.” Moreover, Nehru made it
clear “that he would have no objection if the Canadians said something to
the Americans on these lines.”44
Nonetheless, loyalty to Menon, coupled with a realisation on Nehru’s
part that attacks on his closest confidante often represented a veiled assault
upon himself, left the Indian leader “particularly sensitive to criticism about
Mr. Krishna Menon.”45 Prior to interviewing Nehru, one American journal-
ist recounted how the prime minister had informed him: “You may ask
me about anything except Kashmir or Krishna Menon.”46 Throughout the
1950s, as Menon drew increasing domestic and international censure for
his intercession in issues ranging from the Geneva talks on Indochina to
India’s dispute with Portugal over Goa, Nehru repeatedly sprung to his pro-
tégés defence. In a speech in Madras in January 1957, shortly after Menon
had collapsed theatrically during a UN debate on Kashmir, Nehru chastised
“people in this country and some people in other countries whose job in
life appears to be to run down Krishna Menon because he is far cleverer
than they are, because his record of service for Indian freedom is far longer
than theirs, and because he has worn himself out in the service of India.”47
Nehru’s unswerving support was underlined later the same year when he
actively campaigned to secure Menon’s election to the Lok Sabha. “Menon
is the only Congress candidate,” The Times pointedly observed in its cover-
age of India’s 1957 general election, for whom “Nehru had issued a special
appeal to voters.” On 7 February, speaking at an election rally in Bombay,
where Menon was standing for the Congress Party, Nehru brazenly turned
Menon’s candidacy into a referendum on his government’s foreign policy:
We thought it eminently desirable that our international policy should be
put to the test in the great city of Bombay itself, so that its intelligent cit-
izens might proclaim to the world where we stand and what we believe
in. I trust that the citizens of Bombay will, by giving their enthusiastic
support for Mr. Menon, give fitting answer to the challenge that has been
thrown to us from various quarters.48
Although often fractious, in comparison with their American colleagues,
British policy-makers enjoyed a relatively benign relationship with Menon.
Having lived in Britain between 1924 and 1953, Menon was looked upon by
many Indians as “more British than the British.”49 Whilst appearing to relish
American brickbats, Menon was acutely sensitive to British criticism. After
coming across Menon at the UN in New York, in September 1959, Britain’s
foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, recounted how he had been subjected to
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“another long lament about one who worked so hard for Anglo–Indian
friendship, had kept India in the Commonwealth and was abused in India
for being pro-British, [and] should all the time be so misunderstood by peo-
ple in England.”50 In public, Menon would often round on the British for
their anachronistic colonial policies in the Middle East and Africa, and their
refusal to abandon nuclear testing. Privately, however, British officials were
reassured that even his “bitterest critics” in Nehru’s Cabinet had conceded
that behind closed doors Menon insisted “that Indian policy should be as
helpful to us [Britain] as Indian circumstances permit.” In his role as India’s
defence minister, for example, the British welcomed the fact that Menon had
proved “a stout supporter of the policy of India buying arms from us, and
not from Russia.”51
On another level, the British identified a political advantage in appeas-
ing Menon’s considerable vanity. Capable of flashes of “extreme hostility,”
notably when attacking Britain for its part in the Suez debacle in 1956,
Menon nonetheless remained “very attracted to Britain and the British.” In
analysing his attitude to Britain post-Suez Britain, MacDonald compared it to
that of a “jilted lover,” who had been “deeply hurt” not only by the imprudent
Anglo–French attack on Egypt but, perhaps more importantly, by Britain’s
rejection of his bid act as “the Great Conciliator.” Given his often volatile
and emotional state of mind, MacDonald urged London to ignore Menon’s
public bluster and, wherever practicable, indulge his formidable ego. “In
spite of all other appearances,” MacDonald reminded Whitehall, “Krishna is
fundamentally pro-British, and his ‘love’ can sometimes be encouraged to
prevail over his ‘hate’ by careful handling . . . his excesses of unreasonable-
ness and spite should as far as possible be ignored as qualities personal to
himself and largely unrepresentative of the nation which he represents.”52
However, as Menon’s political power grew in the latter half of the
1950s, MacDonald’s call for restraint became increasingly difficult for Anglo–
American policy-makers to stomach. In 1954, when it first emerged that
Nehru was considering appointing Menon as India’s foreign minister, deputy
foreign minister, or home minister, the British had reacted with incredulity.
“The appointment of Krishna Menon to any of the three posts,” Frank
Roberts, a senior Foreign Official official, reflected, “would fill me person-
ally with horror, alarm and despondency.” Not least, the British reasoned
that such an appointment “would certainly be very ill-received in America
and for that reason alone could hardly do India any good.”53 Having relied
on “the ‘old guard”’ within Nehru’s cabinet, such as Maulana Azad, India’s
minister for education, to block Menon’s advancement,54 the British were
disturbed in 1956 after Menon entered Nehru’s Cabinet as minister without
portfolio. Moreover, during the following year, Menon’s personal standing
within India, which had never been strong, received an unexpected boost.
Having spent almost his entire political career abroad, Menon lacked a
domestic political base. After melodramatic performances in UN debates
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on Kashmir in January and February 1957, however, where he mounted the
longest filibuster in Security Council history, Menon’s fortunes within India
were transformed. Buoyed by the distribution of a Government of India-
sponsored film lauding his exploits in New York, newspapers across the
sub-continent began to refer to Menon as the “Hero of India.”55
In April 1957, with Menon by now ensconced in the Indian Defence
Ministry, the New York Times cautioned its readership that Nehru’s “faintly
satanic confidante” was now set to exert a growing and malevolent influence
over India’s foreign policy.56 The British preferred to look on the bright
side, rationalising that Menon’s ministerial responsibilities ought to leave
him with less time to meddle in international affairs. As MacDonald noted
that September:
[Menon] has become much more than an infernal nuisance; he has
long been a menace to good relations between India and the United
States, and now he has become a menace to good relations between
India and the United Kingdom . . . his continued participation in inter-
national affairs is a constant prejudice to friendship between India and
the Western Democracies, and we must look forward with keen antici-
pation to the prospect of his disappearance next year as India’s principal
representative in various world affairs . . .57
In 1958, the British took additional heart from signs that Nehru had distanced
himself from Menon. Notably, during that summer’s Middle Eastern crisis,
which had been precipitated by the demise of the Hashemite monarchy in
Iraq, Nehru rejected Menon’s call to denounce the arrival of Anglo–American
forces in Lebanon and Jordon. To Menon’s ire, Nehru kept him at arm’s
length throughout the crisis, relying instead on the counsel of his home
minister, Pandit Pant, and officials from India’s ministry for external affairs.
Observing that such a welcome development was “all to the good,” the
British remained reluctant to afford it too much significance. “We cannot,”
MacDonald cautioned the CRO, “count on Krishna Menon’s influence [over
Nehru] being anything like eliminated.” MacDonald’s warning appeared pre-
scient later that year when, to British and American disappointment, Nehru
reappointed Menon to lead India’s delegation at the UN.58
Uncomfortably for Anglo–American policy-makers, Menon’s rise to
political prominence in the second half of the 1950s coincided with a
realisation on the part of Eisenhower’s administration that India’s burgeon-
ing population, untapped economic resources, latent military power, and
democratic credentials constituted a valuable Cold War prize. Furthermore,
the victory of John F. Kennedy in the American presidential election in
November 1960 added fresh impetus to the reorientation in American
thinking toward India initiated under Eisenhower. In December 1959, the
then-Senator Kennedy had predicted that India’s competition with China
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
2.2
3.1
62
.18
9]
 at
 04
:08
 11
 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
248 P. M. McGarr
for Asian pre-eminence would constitute, “the decisive struggle in the cold
war in the next ten years.”59 With the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
outpacing India in steel production, industrial capacity, literacy rates, and
domestic consumption, Kennedy came to the Oval Office fearful that a
failure to contain Communist Chinese power would leave subsequent gen-
erations of Americans facing an apocalyptic future. Looking forward to the
1970s, Kennedy envisioned the PRC, with a population of 700 million,
a Stalinist internal regime, and nuclear weapons, posing an unacceptable
threat to world peace.60 With India the only feasible Asian counterweight
to China, Kennedy set about wooing Nehru by lavishing his government
with economic aid and professing a new sensitivity toward India’s policy of
non-alignment.61
Less concerned with safeguarding Asia from a Communist Chinese men-
ace that they saw as largely illusory, the British signed on to Kennedy’s bid to
enhance Western relations with India as a defensive measure. To the cash-
strapped British Conservative government of Harold Macmillan, America’s
growing interest in India constituted a threat to the dominant, and highly
lucrative, position that Britain had retained in the commercial and defence
sectors of the Indian economy since 1947. Although total American invest-
ment in India lagged well behind that of the British well into the 1960s, a
warning sign had appeared in 1957 when America overtook Britain as the
largest net investor of private foreign capital on the sub-continent.62 Similar
trends were evident in the defence arena, where festering Sino–Indian ten-
sions induced Nehru’s government to entertain sales pitches from American
defence contractors previously deemed personae non grata. Left unchecked,
developing Indo–American commercial and political ties risked prejudicing
Britain’s position in India.63 By working with the Kennedy Administration in
South Asia, Macmillan’s government reasoned, it could moderate the impact
of American regional policy and safeguard valuable British interests.
Aware of Menon’s ability to derail its plan to cultivate closer Indo–
American relations, the Kennedy Administration sought to place the United
States’ relationship with India’s defence minister on a new and more
constructive, footing. “Krishna Menon is an odd and difficult character,”
Kennedy’s ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, acknowledged
in May 1961. “But some small part of the problem, I think, is that the
Republicans treated him with all the warmth and tact of a Brahmin encoun-
tering a leprous untouchable at his table.”64 Moreover, as a left-leaning,
liberal Democrat and fellow political maverick, Galbraith found Menon’s
politics relatively unobjectionable and, initially at least, embraced his eccen-
tricity. “Most people dislike him [Menon],” Galbraith recorded after their first
meeting. “I found him rather attractive. . . . Provisionally it is my conclusion
that those who do not like him have never encountered this particu-
lar kind of public figure.”65 Tellingly, during Nehru’s first meeting with
a senior Kennedy Administration official, Averell Harriman, in New Delhi
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in March 1961, Menon featured prominently. Harriman, whom Kennedy
had appointed his ambassador-at-large, explicitly called for an end to the
enervating public clashes that had characterised Menon’s interaction with
American diplomats in the 1950s. “I personally enjoyed talking with Mr.
Menon as he always said something insulting about us and I enjoyed argu-
ing with him,” Harriman joked with Nehru, before adding pointedly that
“others did not take his insulting remarks so well.”66
Kennedy’s Administration, however, soon found its relationship with
India, and Menon, under strain. Kennedy was disappointed to find Nehru
listless and disengaged when they met in Washington in November 1961,
and he failed to establish a rapport with the Indian premier.67 Menon, too,
quickly found himself on the wrong side of the New Frontier, after launch-
ing barbed attacks on Kennedy’s handling of issues such as the Congo crisis
and Kashmir. Although personally irked by Menon’s invective, Kennedy’s
primary concern was that it would poison American attitudes toward India
and erode Congressional support for the appropriation of American eco-
nomic aid to Nehru’s government. Economic aid formed the cornerstone
of Kennedy’s South Asian policy, a fact evident from the foreign assistance
budget his Administration prepared for the fiscal year 1962. It earmarked
India a remarkable US$500 million from a global aid budget totalling US$900
million.68 Moreover, as the Eisenhower Administration had previously dis-
covered, persuading Capitol Hill to fund India’s economic development was
no easy task. When Ellsworth Bunker, America’s ambassador to India, had
returned to Washington to lobby for Indian aid in June 1957, he was taken
aback by “the great resentment” that Menon generated amongst American
legislators. In conversation with Dalip Singh Saund, Democratic representa-
tive for California’s twenty-ninth district and the only member of Congress of
Indian descent, Bunker was candidly informed that “there was absolutely no
possibility of any legislation involving aid to India going through the House
of Representatives so long as Mr. Menon was at the U.N.”69
Kennedy had raised concerns over the link between Menon’s anti-
American rhetoric and his Administration’s ability to deliver economic aid
to India during his November meeting with Nehru. On Nehru’s instruc-
tion, Menon was subsequently directed to call on the White House in a
bid to mend fences. Kennedy’s encounter with Menon on 21 November
was presented in the American press as an opportunity for the president
to make a “personal acquaintance with a particularly important diplomat
who has been a recurrent cause of despair to this country.”70 Kennedy’s
brief thirty-minute session with Menon turned out to be as unproductive as
the president’s earlier encounter with Nehru. Moreover, during the twelve
months that followed, a series of public disagreements between India and
the United States highlighted the fundamentally different attitudes that each
held on a raft of international issues. More often than not, however, rather
than confront and wherever possible ameliorate their differences with India,
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Anglo–American policy-makers found it expedient to identify the nefarious
influence of Krishna Menon as at the root of their problems.
Such was the case in December 1961, when the Indian army ended
Portugal’s four-hundred-and sixty-year presence in the enclaves of Goa,
Daman, and Diu, situated along India’s Western coast. With the Indian press
characterising the Goa “police action” as “Krishna Menon’s War,” Anglo–
American officials speculated whether, in light of Nehru’s stated reluctance to
use force against the Portuguese, his defence minister had not orchestrated
the military operation.71 Britain’s chief of defence staff, Lord Mountbatten,
certainly felt so, observing at the time that “I will never believe he [Nehru]
cooked [it] up.”72 With Menon having been sharply criticised in India in
1961 for allowing Chinese infringements of the country’s northern border
to go unchallenged, and with a large Goan community resident in his north
Bombay parliamentary constituency, the American press were quick to point
out that Menon had a strong political interest in giving the Portuguese a
bloody nose.73
American officials pondered whether by forcing the United States to
denounce India’s use of force against the Portuguese, Menon had delib-
erately set out to whip up anti-American feeling74—or worse still, foster a
climate of jingoism as a precursor to an Indian attack on Pakistan.75 Menon
retrospectively dismissed such conspiracy theories as fanciful, arguing that
he had merely followed Nehru’s lead when it came to Goa. From the late
1950s, Nehru had displayed a tendency to vacillate when confronted with
thorny political problems. Early in 1959, he had sanctioned a campaign
of civil disobedience by Congress Party supporters against the democrati-
cally elected Communist government in Kerala and then dithered for months
before finally removing the incumbent administration and imposing direct
rule from New Delhi.76 In late 1961, Nehru faced intense pressure both at
home, and from Afro–Asian nationalists abroad, to strike a blow against
Portuguese colonialism. In this context, Menon’s assertion that Nehru had
sanctioned the Goa assault, and then shirked responsibility for the military
consequences of his decision, appears plausible. Nehru, “didn’t like the vul-
garity and the cruelty of it [Goa],” Menon asserted, “but at the same time he
wanted the results—the liberation of Indian territory.”77 The CIA supported
Menon’s account of the Goa episode, concluding that Nehru had indeed
pulled the strings, with Menon served up to the international community as
a “whipping boy.”78
Anxious to avoid a schism in Indo–American relations, the Kennedy
Administration sought to downplay the Goa annexation. On 18 December
1962, Rusk issued instructions to America’s diplomats, including Adlai
Stevenson, the ambassador to the UN, to temper public criticism of India’s
use of force against the Portuguese.79 But having been subjected to Menon’s
diatribes on numerous occasions in New York, Stevenson found it impossi-
ble to resist launching into a verbal tirade against “India’s act of aggression”
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in the Security Council.80 Reflecting upon Stevenson’s “very stern and, I
think, unfortunately emotional speech,” a despondent Galbraith attributed
it in large part to the UN ambassador’s desire “to spill some of his anger
at Krishna Menon.”81 Predictably, the Indian government, which had been
prepared to accept a token show of American disapproval over Goa, reacted
angrily. India’s ambassador in Washington, B. K. Nehru, complained to
the State Department that by permitting Stevenson to vent his spleen, it
had “handled [Goa] in the ‘wrong way”’ and needlessly offended Indian
opinion.82
Tension over Goa had barely subsided in May 1962, when it emerged
that India had begun negotiations with Moscow to purchase the latest Soviet
supersonic jet fighter, the MIG-21. From an Indian standpoint, the Soviet
fighter was attractive on a number of levels. Militarily, Indian ministers were
anxious to react to Kennedy’s decision in July 1961 to supply Pakistan with
American supersonic jets and to the threat posed by deteriorating Sino–
Indian relations.83 Equally, the paucity of India’s foreign exchange reserves
made the relatively cheap Soviet aircraft a bargain in comparison with more
expensive Western alternatives.84 Once more, however, Menon was cast as
the villain of the piece by Anglo–American officials, who had grown accus-
tomed to India sourcing its military hardware from the West. For Duncan
Sandys, Britain’s secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations, India’s deci-
sion to purchase Soviet aircraft indicated that within the Indian Cabinet:
“[The] more right-wing Ministers, including Mr. Morarji Desai [India’s finance
minister] have not got the guts to stand up to Mr. Nehru against Mr. Krishna
Menon and the pro-Russian faction.”85
Furthermore, coming at a time when the Kennedy Administration’s
Foreign Aid Bill was passing through Congress, British and American offi-
cials feared that disgruntled legislators on Capitol Hill would punish India for
its military flirtation with the Soviets by slashing its allocation of American
economic aid.86 This, once again, threatened to upset Kennedy’s plan to
use American financial muscle to drive India’s economic performance past
that of Communist China. Writing to Kennedy on 11 May 1962, the Missouri
senator, Stuart Symington, articulated a viewpoint shared by many of his col-
leagues in Congress. “Where is the logic,” Symington asked, “in providing
such multi-billion dollar assistance to a country whose Secretary of Defence
constantly attacks us, [and] whose military plans and programs build up the
Soviet economy at the expense of our allies and ourselves?”87
Many British parliamentarians sympathised with Symington’s stance. In
discussion with Desai in July 1961, Selwyn Lloyd, then Britain’s chancellor
of the exchequer, warned that Menon’s criticisms of British colonial policy in
the UN, coupled with the furore over the MIG purchase, made it difficult for
Britain to justify supplying India with significant amounts of aid. In response,
Selwyn Lloyd noted: “Desai was exceedingly frank about Mr. Krishna Menon.
He said in effect that he was a menace; he wished he could get rid of him
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but that Krishna Menon had such an ascendancy over Nehru that it was
not possible. He understood our feelings but hoped that we would do our
best.”88 India’s government, the British concluded gloomily, appeared bent
on pursuing policies inimical to Anglo–American interests “in the face of
clear signs of danger to India’s relations with the West.” Such “brinkman-
ship,” officials at the CRO reasoned predictably, “is certainly the work of
Mr. Krishna Menon.”89
On the back of the “liberation” of Goa and the outrage that many
Indians felt at thinly veiled Anglo–American attempts to bully Nehru’s
government into abandoning India’s purchase of Soviet fighters, Menon’s
political currency in India soared in early 1962. Never one to spurn a public
relations opportunity, Menon successfully reinvented himself as a national
patriot, the “Liberator of Goa,” and “Defender of Kashmir.”90 In India’s gen-
eral election that year, a hotly contested battle between Menon and Acharya
Kripalani, the Praya Socialist Party candidate in North Bombay, ended with
Menon being returned to the Lok Sabha in a landslide.91 “The increased
domestic prestige and authority of Krishna Menon,” the British noted sub-
sequently, .” . . . may have quite a considerable effect on Indian external
policy in the short run.”92 What is more, in Whitehall that effect appeared to
be progressively, “rabidly anti-American” and “increasingly pro-Russian.”93
State Department senior officials began to worry that “Krishna Menon is well
aware that he has no future as a pro-Westerner, nor in a pro-Western India, and
that it is vital to his fortunes that Indian have a serious break with the U.S.”94
Menon’s perceived shift to the left was all the more alarming to British
and American policy-makers in the context of Nehru’s failing health. Up
until Spring 1962, Nehru had been in robust physical condition for a man
in his seventies. That April, however, he contracted a viral infection of the
urinary tract and spent much of the month in bed.95 Years of overwork,
it seemed, had finally caught up with him. To Sir Paul Gore Booth, who
had succeeded MacDonald as Britain’s High Commissioner in India in 1960,
Nehru appeared “noticeably slower in response. Less curious, more preju-
diced, and, above all, more tired.”96 More significantly, the British judged
that Nehru’s “decisions themselves are . . . less his own than they used to be
. . . . he is certainly more vulnerable to over-persuasion by men of determi-
nation, in particular Krishna Menon, who knows exactly what he wants and
works with unscrupulous vigour to achieve it.”97
And it was not only Nehru’s health that generated concern in London
and Washington. Menon, who had a long history of physical and psycho-
logical infirmity stretching back to the 1930s, was seen by Anglo–American
officials as emotionally unstable and dangerously irrational. In 1935, follow-
ing the death of his father and the collapse of a long-term relationship,
Menon had suffered a nervous breakdown and been hospitalised.98 During
the course of his rehabilitation, Menon became dependent on luminal, a
barbiturate-based sedative, the side-effects of which included confusion, loss
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of consciousness, and paranoia. A second nervous breakdown followed in
1951.99 Menon’s histrionic performances at the United Nations in the 1950s
added further grist to the mill of opponents who speculated that the Indian
minister was intrinsically unsound. In November 1957, Sir Pearson Dixon,
Britain’s ambassador to the UN, informed London that Menon had stumbled
through “a more than usually incoherent” speech to the Security Council
whilst “evidently under the influence of artificial stimulants.”100 Question
marks continued to remain over Menon’s mental health into the 1960s. In
September 1961, he underwent minor brain surgery after falling in his New
Delhi bathroom and sustaining a blow to his head. “As operations go,” the
British concluded, “this was not a serious one, but whether as a cause or
effect of his fall, Mr. Menon . . . behaves at intervals in public with a strange
rudeness or apathy, in either case abnormal and a little alarming.”101
By mid-1962, with the ailing Nehru reluctant to anoint publicly a polit-
ical heir, Anglo–American officials evidenced growing concern that, either
by default or design, a door was being left open for Menon to step into
his mentor’s shoes. Under the headline “Who’s Next” in the summer of
1962, Time magazine speculated on Nehru’s likely successors as prime min-
ister. Contemplating that the Congress Party favoured “straw man” in the
top job, Time installed India’s “bland” home minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, as
the frontrunner to become India’s next leader. Desai from the conservative
wing of the Congress Party and the Socialist leader, Jayaprakash Narayan,
were also mentioned as potential premiers-in-waiting. According to Time,
however, Nehru’s preferred successor was Menon.102 Intriguingly, as the
doyen of Congress’ left-wing, Menon was also Moscow’s choice to replace
Nehru. Accordingly, in May 1962, in a singularly ineffective operation, the
Soviet presidium, it appears without Menon’s knowledge, authorised the
KGB residency in New Delhi to initiate a pro-Menon leadership campaign.103
The British saw Desai as better positioned to succeed Nehru. Despite his
personal and political antipathy for Menon, however, should Desai become
India’s next premier, Desai was deemed likely to seek an accommodation
with his political rival. “Menon [would be] . . . too strong [for Desai] to
take on immediately,” the British felt, “and public loyalty to Nehru would
make it difficult for him to contemplate radical changes of government pol-
icy or personnel.”104 Menon’s status as an outsider in the premiership race
was of little comfort to Kennedy’s South Asian advisors, such as Robert
Komer. “If there’s even a one in five chance [of Menon seizing power],”
Komer cautioned McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security advisor in
July 1962, “we ought to run plenty scared.”105 From New Delhi, Galbraith
urged Washington not to over-react when it came to Menon, and to “do
everything possible to avoid building Menon up as we have in the past.”
Denying Menon the oxygen of publicity, the American ambassador argued,
was the best way forward. Menon was after all, he noted ruefully, the “Hindu
Dulles—alienating people as he goes.”106
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The possibility that Menon might seize power through unconstitutional
means also entered into the minds of Anglo–American officials.107 Menon’s
political rivals in India had repeatedly assured the British that he retained
the capacity to launch a coup d’état. In February 1962, Madam Pandit,
Nehru’s sister, informed Sir David Eccles, Britain’s minister of Education, that
“Krishna Menon had threatened the Prime Minister with a military coup if
Mr. Nehru refused to give the order to invade [Goa].” Her brother, she added,
had refused to challenge Menon at the time, judging that his protégé’s grow-
ing power over India’s defence establishment made him “capable, in all
senses of the word,” of following through on his threat. Paul Gore-Booth,
dismissed Pandit’s allegation as overblown. Menon’s political ambition was
indeed palpable, the high commissioner acknowledged, but “he must be
aware of his own unpopularity . . . with a considerable proportion of the
Army, and in political circles, which must make him doubt whether a coup
would be successful.” In sum, it appeared to the British that Menon was
“highly unlikely” to consider attempting “a naked seizure of power,” not
least because with the outcome so uncertain, “Mr. Menon is too clever to
run this kind of risk.”108 Nonetheless, rumours that Menon was busy con-
solidating his grip over India’s armed forces in preparation for “a forcible
bid for power” continued to circulate in New Delhi throughout the summer
of 1962.109
Such gossip was quickly overtaken by an unexpected turn of events
that autumn. The catalyst for Menon’s political downfall arrived on
20 October 1962, when a long-simmering border dispute between India
and the PRC erupted into open conflict. Within a week, Indian forces had
been routed by the People’s Liberation Army, which proceeded to occupy
large swathes of northern India. With his country facing an ignominious
defeat, a shell-shocked Nehru on 26 October qualified his commitment to
non-alignment, and made an unprecedented appeal for international “sym-
pathy and support.”110 Determined to leverage India’s desperate need for
military support to bring about a “closer understanding” between India
and the West, American officials were equally inclined “to have decently
in mind the pounding we have been taking from Krishna Menon.”111
On 23 October, Galbraith candidly informed India’s foreign secretary, M.J.
Desai, that Menon’s retention of the defence portfolio represented one
of the “more serious problems” standing in the way of American mili-
tary aid to India.112 Likewise, in Washington, Kennedy pointedly observed
to B.K. Nehru that in assisting India: “We [the United States] don’t want
to in any way . . . have Krishna enter into this . . . he is a disaster. . . .
Your judgment is that he will continue, however, as defence minister?”113
In an effort to discredit Menon, American officials also inveighed upon
their British colleagues to plant stories in the British press criticising
Menon. The British rejected the American proposal, reasoning that Western
attacks on Menon had invariably proved counter-productive in the past
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and, in this case, were similarly “more likely to save Menon than send
him under.”114
Ultimately, Menon’s fate was sealed not by intrigues hatched in
Washington or London but, rather, by Indian popular opinion. Exposed to
charges that his mismanagement of the Defence Ministry had left India at
the mercy of the perfidious Chinese, Indians were clamouring by the end
of October 1962 for Menon’s head in ever increasing numbers.115 His com-
patriots had taken to silencing Menon, the British noted, by sabotaging his
microphone at public meetings.116 After a last ditch bid by Nehru to save his
friend’s political career floundered, Menon resigned from the Indian Cabinet
on 7 November 1962.117 Sporadic attempts by Menon to revive his career
over the following decade stalled, and he remained in the political wilder-
ness until his death in New Delhi in October 1974. At the time, Menon’s
political eclipse induced a mixture of relief and delight amongst British
and American officials. William J. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, pronounced in December 1962 that he was “particu-
larly delighted . . . that Krishna Menon was gone for good . . . . his demise
would have a salutary effect on Indian policies.”118 Paradoxically, whilst
Fulbright and others rejoiced in Menon’s exit from the Indian political scene,
some more prescient individuals cautioned against affording it too much sig-
nificance. References to non-alignment continued to retain “great evocative
power” within India, Galbraith reminded Washington, whilst “phrases like
military blocs, military alliances, even Pentagon still have a bad sound.”119
In fact, Anglo–American policy-makers were never to reap the political
dividend of closer relations between India and the West that they antici-
pated would follow the severing of Menon’s purportedly Machiavellian hold
over Nehru. After a brief honeymoon period between late 1962 and early
1963, when Britain and the United States were lauded in New Delhi for
furnishing India with diplomatic and military support against the Chinese,
Anglo–American relations with Nehru’s government came under renewed
strain. By the mid-1963, an embittered Nehru had begun to bridle against
British and American attempts to extract a political quid pro quo from
his government in return for continued military assistance. Determined to
preserve the appearance, if not the substance, of Indian non-alignment,
Nehru fought an acrimonious and ultimately successful rearguard action
against the Anglo–Americans to secure an air defence pact with India.120
Similarly, having long painted Menon as a major barrier to an improvement
in Indo–Pakistani relations, Britain and the United States found it no easier to
facilitate progress toward a Kashmir settlement in his absence, despite cajol-
ing India and Pakistan into six rounds of bi-lateral talks that year.121 Indeed,
by the end of 1963, frustrated at its inability to impose external solutions
on complex regional problems, and with a new president, Lyndon Johnson,
in the White House, Lyndon Johnson, whose focus was increasingly drawn
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elsewhere in Asia, India slipped down the list of Washington’s global priori-
ties. Moreover, after the mid-1960s, in the absence of American support, the
British government found its voice on the Indian subcontinent progressively
marginalised.
In retrospect, between 1947 and 1962, the British and American gov-
ernments misjudged Menon’s influence over India’s foreign affairs. Menon’s
showmanship, combustible personality, and association with the political
left made a deep impression on Anglo–American officials, invariably gener-
ating more diplomatic heat than analytical light. Menon’s tactical influence
over the Indian diplomacy was often confused in the West with his more
limited capacity to shape its strategic direction. For all Menon’s bluster and
self-promotion, his usefulness to Nehru was primarily as an implementer,
rather than an originator, of policy. As one prominent observer of Indian
politics has emphasised, Nehru monopolised his governments’ diplomacy.
Other Indian actors, Menon included, were permitted to encroach on to
Nehru’s political territory only when their views accorded with his own.122 It
was Nehru, and Nehru alone, who dictated that India would champion the
virtues of non-alignment, anti-colonialism, and racial equality. It was Nehru
who determined India’s policy on a host of questions from the Kashmir
dispute to relations with China and the Soviet Union.123 In January 1962,
The Economist had argued against the prevailing wisdom that characterised
Nehru’s foreign policy as “a projection of the malign influence of Mr. Krishna
Menon.” “The idea of Jawaharlal Nehru as the empty vehicle of any other
man’s policy,” it noted, “is a curious one, and only such assumptions make
the “Menon” theory of Indian policy tenable.”124
All too often in the 1950s and early 1960s, British and American policy-
makers attributed the tensions that bedevilled their interaction with India
to Menon’s malevolence. The inconvenient truth, however, was that India,
and Britain and the United States, held different and often incompatible
perspectives on how to tackle the Cold War challenges that confronted South
Asia. More often than not, each Power preferred to demonise the baleful
actions of “foreign devils,” whether Dulles or Menon, than to face up to such
an uncomfortable reality. Looking back on his tumultuous political career
toward the end of the 1960s, Menon asserted that he had been neither “a
buffoon nor a Rasputin.”125 The historical record suggests that, on balance,
he had a point. Krishna Menon was, if anything, more Western folly than
evil Indian genius.
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